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Tax Cases Make Bad Work Product Law: The
Discoverability of Litigation Risk Assessments After
United States v. Textron
In United States v. Textron, Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, in a rehearing en banc, held that tax accrual work papers prepared
by a corporation's lawyers in order to calculate tax reserves for financial
reporting purposes are not protected by the work product doctrine.2 The
majority reasoned that tax accrual work papers are not created in anticipation
of litigation, but rather in the ordinary course of business pursuant to the
securities laws,3 and suggested that documents that are not "preparedfor use in
possible litigation" are beyond the scope of work product protection.4 The
court also emphasized that permitting discovery of tax accrual work papers
"serves the legitimate, and important, function of detecting and disallowing
abusive tax shelters."
5
This Comment argues that Textron's "use in possible litigation" standard is
inconsistent with precedent and, moreover, is normatively undesirable. In
particular, it may deter companies, public and nonpublic, from voluntarily
preparing litigation risk assessments that estimate the company's contingent
liabilities for the benefit of third parties, including potential acquirers or
investors, and thereby impede socially efficient business transactions, while at
the same time diminishing the accuracy of public companies' financial
statements. Moreover, the principle objections to work product protection-
1. 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc).
2. Id. at 21. For the codification of the work product doctrine, see FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3).
3. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30-31.
4. Id. at 27; see also id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
s. Id. at 32 (majority opinion).
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including its potential to deprive the court of relevant information, to lead to
the duplication of efforts in trial preparation, and to encourage overinvestment
in the stakes-dividing function of litigation 6 -are largely inapplicable to
quantitative litigation risk analyses outside of the tax context. Although the
first two of these objections may apply to tax accrual work papers given their
usefulness in combating tax evasion, the negative economic effects of
permitting discovery of litigation risk analyses, including tax work papers,
suggest that work product protection is desirable on balance. Because the
discoverability of litigation risk assessments is likely to interfere with the
efficient functioning of the capital markets and the market for corporate
control, the Supreme Court should grant Textron's petition for certiorari and
affirm their protected status.
I. TEXTRON'S NEW STANDARD
The dispute in Textron began when the IRS brought an action in federal
court to enforce a summons demanding that Textron produce its tax accrual
work papers to facilitate the IRS's investigation of several transactions in which
the company had been involved. Tax accrual work papers are documents
prepared by a company's lawyers that identify potential "soft spots" on the
company's tax return, estimate the probability that the company's position will
be sustained, and use that estimate to recommend an amount that should be
reserved as contingent tax liabilities on the company's financial statements.7
Publicly traded corporations like Textron are required under the federal
securities laws to have audited financial statements that comply with generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), 8 according to which companies must
report certain loss contingencies in their financial statements, including
potential tax liabilities.9 Tax accrual work papers form the basis for the
auditor's evaluation of the sufficiency of the company's tax reserves."
The majority in Textron held that the preparation of Textron's work papers
was statutorily mandated and that the documents were thus created not in
anticipation of litigation but rather in the ordinary course of business in order
6. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REv. 1515,1571-73 (1991).
7. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 812-13 (1984).
8. See15 U.S.C. SS 781, 78m (2006); 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (2009).
9. See RESEARCH AND DEv. ARRANGEMENTS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5,
paras. 9-13 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) [hereinafter Statement of Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 5] (discussing accounting for contingencies).
1o. Textron, 577 F.3d at 23.
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to prepare financial statements and obtain a clean audit report." As a doctrinal
matter, this reasoning is problematic. The circuits have adopted two distinct
tests to determine whether a dual-purpose document that is prepared in
expectation of litigation but also for a business purpose is entitled to work
product protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). The Fifth
Circuit applies a primary motivating purpose test under which a document
qualifies for work product protection only if "the primary motivating purpose
behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation."'
2
Based on this primary purpose test, the Fifth Circuit, the only circuit to
specifically address the status of tax accrual work papers prior to Textron, also
concluded that they are not work product because their primary purpose is "to
back up a figure on a financial balance sheet" rather than to assist in litigation. 3
However, a majority of circuits, including the First Circuit, have rejected
the Fifth Circuit's "primary motivating purpose" test, instead interpreting the
work product doctrine to cover documents prepared "because of' the prospect
of litigation even if the documents were also prepared for a business purpose.
In United States v. Adlman,'4 a decision later followed by the First Circuit in
Maine v. United States Department of the Interior,"s the Second Circuit rejected
the Fifth Circuit's primary motivating purpose test in favor of a "because of'
test and held that a memorandum analyzing likely IRS challenges to a
proposed reorganization and predicting the outcome of resulting litigation
qualified as work product under the latter test. The court interpreted the work
product doctrine to protect dual purpose documents prepared in anticipation
of litigation but also "to inform a business decision influenced by the prospects
of the litigation "i6 provided that the documents "would not have been
prepared in substantially similar form but for the prospect of that litigation."
1 7
Although neither AdIman nor Maine dealt specifically with tax accrual work
papers, such work papers would seem to merit protection under the "because
of' test since they would not need to be prepared but for the possibility of
litigation with the IRS. 8
ni. Id. at 27, 30-31.
12. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028,1040 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981).
13. United States v. El Paso, Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544 (5th Cir. 1982).
14. 134 F. 3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998).
15. 298 F.3d 6o, 68 (1st Cir. 2002).
16. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1197-98.
17. Id. at 1195.
i. One court recently held that a company's tax accrual work papers would be protected even
under the primary purpose test because the documents "would not have been created were
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In the face of these contrary precedents, the majority in Textron appears to
have crafted a new standard limiting work product protection to documents
prepared for use in litigation. The court repeatedly emphasized that the work
product privilege is "aimed centrally at protecting the litigation process"'" and
that the focus of the doctrine has been on "materials prepared for use in
litigation."20 Tax accrual work papers, the court reasoned, cannot be said to be
prepared "for use in possible litigation "21 since they would not assist Textron in
litigating against the IRS." As Judge Torruella pointed out in dissent,
however, this narrow interpretation of the work product doctrine was expressly
rejected in AdIman on the theory that Rule 26(b) (3) protects both documents
"prepared . . . for trial" and those prepared "in anticipation of litigation," and
an interpretation requiring that the documents be prepared to assist at trial
would render the latter phrase meaningless. 3 Thus, although the majority
purported to reaffirm Maine,' its analysis cannot be squared with the "because
of" test. Instead, the opinion must be read as an attempt to eliminate work
product protection for documents that are prepared in order to analyze a
company's litigation prospects for a business purpose rather than for use at
trial.
The majority was motivated by concern over the ability of the IRS to detect
tax avoidance transactions, but its "prepared for use in possible litigation" test
will likely have a negative effect on the production of litigation risk assessments
for business purposes, whether or not they involve potential tax liabilities. Part
II of this Comment will discuss these problems in greater detail; it will also
argue that outside of the tax context the discoverability of litigation risk
analyses is unlikely to produce countervailing benefits."
(the company] not primarily concerned with litigating with the IRS." Regions Fin. Corp. v.
United States, No. 2:o6-CV-oo895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *7 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008).
19. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Coastal States
Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 869 (D.C. Cir. 198o)).
2o. Id. at 29.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Id. at 30.
23. Id. at 34 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198-99
(2d Cir. 1998)).
24. Id. at 26 (majority opinion).
25. The court could have decided the case on the narrower ground that it is per se unreasonable
to anticipate litigation with the IRS prior to an audit. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Protecting
Abusive Tax Avoidance, 12o TAX NOTES 857, 871 (20o8). But see Terrence G. Perris, Court
Applies Work Product Privilege to Tax Accrual Workpapers, 8o PRAc. TAx STRATEGIES 4, 10
(2008) (noting that regular tax audits often become contentious). The district court rejected
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II. TEXTRON AS BAD LAW
The dissent in Textron briefly alluded to the potentially broad ramifications
of the court's holding for litigation risk analyses prepared for business
purposes. 6 This Part argues that the court's "use in possible litigation"
standard is misguided, certainly when applied to litigation risk assessments
outside of the tax context, but arguably within the tax arena as well. First, it
will likely chill the preparation of these analyses and as a result reduce the
quality of information available to potential investors and acquirers. Second,
most of the arguments against a broad work product doctrine are inapplicable
to quantitative litigation risk assessments outside of the tax context.
A. The Chilling Effect
The strongest argument against Textron's "use" standard is that there are
net social benefits associated with the creation of litigation risk assessments,
whether prepared to estimate potential tax or nontax liabilities, and the holding
in Textron is likely to discourage companies from preparing such analyses for
fear that they will be discoverable by the company's adversary in litigation.
Indeed, in Hickman v. Taylor, the origin of the work product privilege, the
Supreme Court justified the privilege in part on the ground that a contrary rule
would discourage lawyers from writing things down.27 In Hickman, the Court
was concerned with the effect this would have on the adversary system and on
lawyers' ability to prepare their cases." In the context of litigation risk
assessments, such a chilling effect is concerning not because it interferes with
lawyers' ability to prepare their cases but because it decreases the amount and
quality of information about a company that is available to the market,
including potential third party investors.
This informational effect can take two forms depending on whether the
company is required to file audited financial statements with the SEC. First,
with respect to public companies that are subject to the periodic reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,29 an accurate litigation
this argument and the First Circuit did not pursue it. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F.
Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I. 2007).
26. Textron, 577 F.3d at 37-38 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
27. 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
2s. Id.
29. This includes companies with a class of securities that trades on a national exchange and
companies with $1o million in assets and a class of equity securities held by 500 or more
people. IS U.S.C. §§ 781(a), 781(g)(1), 78m(a) (2006); 17 C.F.R. 24o.12g-1 (2009).
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risk assessment enhances the reliability of the company's estimation of its
contingent liabilities in its financial statements, which increases the efficiency
of the capital markets. Because litigation risk assessments that are prepared for
financial reporting purposes set forth the lawyer's estimate of potential liability
separately for each claim asserted against the company,"° whereas financial
statements do not necessarily distinguish among each of the various claims,3'
the discoverability of such analyses can be expected to furnish the company's
litigation adversary with useful information concerning the company's
settlement value. As such, companies may be reluctant to thoroughly and
honestly investigate the company's litigation prospects, and this reluctance will
impair the accuracy of financial reporting.
The majority in Textron implicitly rejected this argument, noting that the
securities laws and auditing requirements ensure that tax work papers "will be
carefully prepared, in their present form, even though not protected."32 The
problem with this reasoning is that the applicable accounting standards only
require companies to report a loss contingency (and thus to prepare a risk
analysis to support its calculation) if there is a reasonable possibility that a loss
has been incurred and an estimate of the possible loss can be made.33 Moreover,
reporting is not required unless the contingent litigation liability at issue is
material,14 meaning that the magnitude of the litigation is such that the
judgment of a reasonable investor relying upon the company's financial
statements would be influenced by its inclusion. Companies enjoy some
discretion in determining whether a contingent litigation liability meets these
relatively nebulous standards, s6 and the holding in Textron gives them an extra
incentive to err on the side of restraint rather than full disclosure.
7
30. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 12, § 33 7 .o 9 (d)(2) (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972).
31. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 23.
32. Id. at 31-32; see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 8o5, 818-19 (1984)
(suggesting that auditors can effectively police self-censorship by corporations).
33- Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5, supra note 9,S 1O.
34. Id.
3S. RESEARCH AND DEv. ARRANGEMENTS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 2, 5 132
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 198o).
36. The Financial Accounting Standards Board considered eliminating some of this discretion
by making its disclosure standards more stringent. RESEARCH AND DEv. ARRANGEMENTS,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards Nos. 5 & 141, §§ 5-6 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd.) (Exposure Draft 2oo8). These proposed amendments have not been adopted.
37. See Claudine Pease-Wingenter, The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Tax Accrual
Workpapers: The Real Legacy of United States v. Textron, 8 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 337, 341
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Second, whether or not a company is subject to the SEC's reporting
requirements, assessing the scope of potential liability arising out of threatened
or pending litigation is an important element of the due diligence that potential
acquirers and investors conduct in evaluating a company's business.38 As to
nonreporting companies, whose financial statements need not comply with
GAAP,39 the decision in Textron may deter them from preparing litigation risk
assessments that they might otherwise voluntarily furnish in connection with
certain business transactions, including the sale of the company or a division or
subsidiary thereof, or capital-raising transactions, such as a private placement
of the company's debt or equity securities to a small number of accredited
investors.4' After Textron, even companies that must comply with the SEC's
reporting requirements may be deterred from voluntarily creating litigation
risk analyses in connection with such transactions when the particular
litigation at issue does not meet the standards for mandatory disclosure under
GAAP, which, as discussed above, only requires companies to report loss
contingencies that are material, estimable, and reasonably possible to lead to an
actual loss.4' This might be the case in situations in which a company is selling
a division and the litigation is material to that division but not to the company
as a whole, or where it is not "reasonably possible" that the litigation will lead
to an actual loss but in the event that it does the magnitude of the liability
would be significant. In each case, the company's public financial statements
will not reflect the particular litigation liability, and the company might be
reluctant to voluntarily furnish the acquirer or investor with an analysis
quantifying the company's potential liability for fear that the analysis would be
discoverable.
This chilling effect is problematic because litigation risk assessments can
serve a number of instrumental functions in facilitating the consummation of
business transactions. Potential acquirers and investors may insist upon the
preparation of such assessments because they may provide them with valuable
information concerning the company's litigation risks and in some cases may
(2008) (suggesting that prior to 2002 the IRS exercised restraint in requesting tax work
papers in part out of concern for the accuracy of financial reporting).
38. Timothy R. Donovan & John C. Jaye, Due Diligence: The Overlooked Cornerstone, 32 REV.
SEC. & COMMODIrLEs REG. 195, 198, 201 (1999).
39. Some nonpublic companies may be contractually required under a loan agreement to have
audited financial statements.
40. Private placements are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and
thus the issuer need not provide investors with audited financial statements. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (2006); 17 C.F.R. SS 230.501-.5o8 (2009).
41. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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form the basis for a cause of action under the securities laws if the company
knowingly misrepresents its litigation prospects. 42 Without the assurances that
a litigation risk analysis can provide to potential outside investors, they may be
unwilling to purchase the company's securities or enter into a business
combination with the company or, if they do so, they may value the company
on a "worst case" basis. In the case of certain private company acquisitions, a
written analysis of the company's litigation risks may also influence the
allocation of liability for (and as a result, the control of the defense of) the
litigation as set forth in the purchase agreement. To the extent that the
litigation affects the post-closing conduct of the business, either because the
litigation relates to an ongoing course of conduct or because the litigation
involves parties with whom the buyer will have continued dealings in the post-
closing period, it might be efficient for the buyer to assume some or all of the
control and risk of a particular litigation.43 But if the buyer does not have a
sense of the magnitude of potential liability involved, then it may be reluctant
to do so, or it may evaluate the litigation risk on a worst case basis and insist on
a substantial purchase price adjustment, to which the seller is unlikely to agree.
As a result, the seller may retain control of the litigation, which is an inefficient
outcome. Thus, by chilling the voluntary creation of litigation risk assessments,
the decision in Textron may hinder the ability of both public and nonpublic
companies to engage in socially efficient business combinations and
capital-raising transactions.
B. The Arguments Against Work Product Protection
In light of the chilling effect that the First Circuit's use standard is likely to
have on the creation of litigation risk assessments, the question becomes
whether the discoverability of such documents will produce any countervailing
benefits. In particular, we might ask whether any of the arguments against a
broad work product doctrine - principally, that it may impede the court's
search for truth, lead to the duplication of efforts in trial preparation, and
encourage overinvestment in the stakes-dividing function of litigation -apply
with special force to litigation risk assessments. This Section suggests that
although some of these objections might possibly apply in the narrow context
42. See 17 C.F.R. S 24o.lob- 5 (prohibiting material misstatements in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security).
43. For example, the buyer may be in a better position to mitigate damages or have better
incentives than the seller in deciding whether to pursue litigation that might sour an
important business relationship of the company. See 2 Lou R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT,
NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIvISIONS § 15.02 (2009).
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of tax accrual work papers, they are largely inapposite with respect to
quantitative litigation risk assessments more generally. This observation
counsels for more rather than less protection for litigation risk analyses as
compared to documents actually used in litigation.
1. The Search for Truth
The most basic argument against the work product doctrine and in favor of
permissive discovery is that, as an evidentiary privilege, the doctrine may
deprive the other party and the court of information relevant to the outcome of
the case.44 This may not only lead to the wrong outcome in a particular case,
but can also reduce the deterrence value of litigation.4" The Textron majority's
concern for the IRS's ability to combat tax evasion is consistent with this
argument insofar as tax accrual work papers have informational value relevant
to the outcome of the case because they identify for the IRS particular "soft
spots" on the company's return.
46
Outside of the tax context, however, litigation risk assessments are unlikely
to contain information that is relevant to the ability of the other party to put
forth its strongest case or of the court to ascertain the truth. This is because by
the time the opposing party seeks discovery of the risk assessment it will
typically already be aware of the underlying transaction giving rise to potential
liability by virtue of having brought suit. By contrast, because of the regular
reporting obligations that the Internal Revenue Code imposes on companies,
the IRS is in a position to benefit from tax accrual work papers even before it
brings an enforcement action. Thus, tax work papers are unique in that they
identify for the IRS particular claims it might otherwise not realize it has
against the company. 47 Outside of the tax context, a litigation risk assessment
prepared for a business purpose that merely provides the lawyer's estimate of
44. See United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (ist Cir. 2009) (en banc); Thornburg,
supra note 6, at 1573.
45. Thornburg, supra note 6, at 1573.
46. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984). Of course, the mere fact
that a company views the proper tax treatment of the transaction in question as less than
absolutely certain does not mean that the company is attempting to evade taxes; such a
determination can only be made after a trial.
47. Whether forcing companies to do the IRS's work for it is consistent with the adversarial
nature of our litigation system is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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the probability that the company will lose the case and the expected damages if
it does lose is unlikely to aid the court's search for truth.4
8
If the typical litigation risk assessment is unlikely to contain relevant
information, however, then this raises two questions, both of which suggest
that the Textron decision might not be as significant outside of the tax context
as this Comment has argued. First, would a litigant actually seek discovery of
an opposing party's litigation risk assessment? Second, if so, would discovery
be denied even without work product protection?
With respect to the first question, it is clear that a litigant would seek
discovery of a litigation risk analysis because although it may not be relevant in
an evidentiary sense it certainly is relevant to the litigant's settlement tactics. As
to the second question, although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit the
scope of discovery to matters relevant to a party's claim or defense,49 this is a
highly permissive standard. Thus, a litigant might convince a court to order
discovery of a risk assessment on the basis of minimal legal analysis contained
therein even if the litigant is primarily interested in the opposing party's
valuation analysis." As such, neither of these is a satisfying response to the
chilling concern expressed in the previous Section.
2. Duplication of Efforts
In addition to the search for truth argument discussed above, another
objection to the work product doctrine is that it leads to an unnecessary and
inefficient duplication of effort in trial preparation."1 This argument has some
traction with respect to tax work papers because even if the IRS could identify
all of the holes in a company's tax return it would only be able to do so at
significant cost. 2 The discoverability of a company's tax accrual work papers
reduces these costs considerably. But outside of the tax context the
discoverability of analyses that quantify the hazards of litigation will not reduce
duplicative costs in trial preparation precisely because such analyses generally
lack evidentiary value and thus do not displace the need to discover facts,
48. See Thornburg, supra note 6, at 1579 (conceding that "an attorney's opinion about the
settlement value of a case might not be relevant in the discovery sense").
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
So. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635, 641-42
(1989) (doubting the ability of judges to correctly differentiate between discovery requests
likely to produce relevant information and abusive discovery requests).
Si. See Thornburg, supra note 6, at 1571.
52. See United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (ist Cir. 2009) (en banc); Ventry, supra
note 25, at 871.
119:1715 2010
TAX CASES MAKE BAD WORK PRODUCT LAW
identify witnesses, take depositions, and the like. 3 The duplication of efforts
argument, therefore, does not apply to litigation risk assessments generally.
3. Overinvestment in Litigation
A third objection to a broad work product privilege stems from the premise
that litigants tend to overinvest in the stakes-dividing function of litigation. s4
This overinvestment allegedly results from the fact that, although society is
indifferent (from an efficiency perspective) as to the distributional effects of a
case, the parties' investment is motivated primarily by "the size of the stakes
rather than by the value of the case as a precedent.""5 Because a narrower work
product privilege permits the opposing party to free ride on a lawyer's
research s6 it reduces the value of trial preparation and mitigates the
overinvestment problem.1
7
Whatever its general merits, 8  the overinvestment argument is
unconvincing as applied to litigation risk assessments, including tax accrual
work papers, for two reasons. First, to the extent that such analyses are
prepared for a business purpose and do not include legal theories or strategies,
their discoverability will not enable opposing counsel to free ride on the other
side's research and thus will not solve the supposed overinvestment problem.
More fundamentally, the cost of creating a litigation risk assessment does not
qualify as investment in the stakes-dividing function of litigation but instead is
incurred for business purposes and as such produces positive social benefits.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Textron denies work product protection to litigation risk
analyses prepared for a business purpose rather than for "use in possible
53. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 361-62 (suggesting that more generous
discovery offactual matters might prevent unnecessary duplication of efforts).
54. Id. at 360.
55. Id.
s6. See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (1999) (Posner, J.).
57. Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 36o-61.
5s. To the extent that the ability of an opposing party to free ride on an attorney's research
might lead to a decline in attorney preparation, it could also hinder the court's search for
truth and undermine the adversary system. See, e.g., D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney
Work Product Doctrine and Carry-Over Immunity: An Assessment of Their Justifications, 47 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 675, 684-85 (1986).
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litigation." The court's holding will likely chill the socially valuable preparation
of such analyses in connection with business transactions and may reduce the
accuracy of public companies' financial statements. At the same time, although
some of the arguments against an expansive work product doctrine may apply
in the narrow context of tax accrual work papers because of their utility to the
IRS in combating tax evasion, they are mainly inapplicable to litigation risk
assessments outside of the tax context. There is now effectively a three-way
circuit split concerning the application of the work product doctrine to
documents that quantify a company's litigation exposure for a business
purpose. In light of the negative effect that the discoverability of such litigation
risk analyses can be expected to have on the capital markets and on the market
for corporate control, it is time for the Supreme Court to step in and affirm
their protected status. Until it does, the other circuits should decline to follow
Textron's lead.
JACOB A. KLING
